How Close Can Canada Really Get to the EU? The Associate-Member Idea Between Law and Politics

A quiet but telling rapprochement has been building between Canada and the EU in recent months. Two drivers stand out: shared unease about U.S. President Donald Trump and a common interest in preserving what remains of the rules-based order. Prime Minister Mark Carney's first foreign trip to France, where he called Canada the most European of non-European countries, and his Davos speech on middle powers — widely read as an appeal to the EU's own collection of middle powers — set the tone. Both sides are also looking to reduce over-dependence on the United States.

Public opinion has added momentum. Polls suggest a majority of Canadians would back closer ties with the EU, and a quip from Finnish President Alexander Stubb to CBC — that Canada would make a lovely 28th member rather than a 51st U.S. state — captured headlines. Trump's latest tariff moves against Canada intensified the mood. Low-key leader contacts turned into a louder debate about what closeness could actually mean.

The Wall Street Journal moved that debate up a notch this week. The paper reported that Carney, in Brussels to attend European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's State of the Union address and to address the European Parliament, is exploring an associate-member idea. The Journal described regular contact between Carney and French President Emmanuel Macron, a suggestion from Macron that Canadians could live and work in Europe without visas, and officials in Ottawa examining how to reorient parts of the Canadian economy toward Europe.

Visa-Free Travel: Legally Plausible, Politically Hard

Visa-free travel looks legally straightforward at first glance. Iceland is the usual reference: not an EU member and without a land border with the bloc, it still enjoys visa-free movement through Schengen arrangements. A similar construct could be imagined for Canada. Politics is the harder part. With member states currently debating border checks among themselves, convincing every capital to endorse a visa-free regime for Canada is far from easy. Canada's historically liberal immigration system adds to hesitation at the negotiating table.

Economic integration offers a broader menu. Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein take part in the single market via the European Economic Area, while Switzerland sits in the EU's economic orbit through a patchwork of bilateral accords. From Ottawa's perspective, the most intriguing templates are the tailored associations the EU recently struck with Andorra and San Marino. Those allow participation in the single market without joining the EU or EFTA, while regulations are gradually aligned. Flexibility exists, but alignment has costs.

Infrastructure Vision: From Cables to Satellites

The Journal's infrastructure sketch is notable. It mentions subsea cables linking Europe and Canada, pipelines that could carry Canadian gas to Europe, and joint build-outs of data centers, cloud storage and new satellite networks outside the reach of American tech firms. These are not just trade projects but strategic-autonomy bets. Reducing dependence on the United States for energy security and data sovereignty aligns with vulnerabilities both sides have felt in recent years.

Is full membership conceivable? Carney himself prefers the phrase unique alliance over membership, yet the video argues no clear legal bar exists. Article 49 of the EU's founding treaty says only European states may apply, without defining what European means. The Community itself acknowledged in 1992 that a strict definition was impossible, noting the term blends geographical, historical and cultural elements and that fixing the Union's frontiers early would be unwise. Culturally, Canada looks familiar — a social democracy with a strong welfare state and deep ties to France and the United Kingdom. Geography is elastic too: Cyprus and Malta sit closer to other regions than to continental Europe, Turkey remains a candidate despite being largely in West Asia, and Algeria was part of the European Economic Community until independence in 1962. Canada also shares a maritime frontier with the EU via Saint Pierre and Miquelon off Newfoundland and a land link to an EU member's territory via Greenland, even though Greenland itself is outside the EU.

Political Friction

Legal openness does not erase political friction. Every EU deal is shaped by intra-bloc bargaining, and the comprehensive trade accord with Canada signed more than a decade ago still awaits ratification by ten member states, including France and Italy, among others. Some capitals also worry about antagonizing Washington, a concern that has already slowed European responses to Trump. There is a further incentive problem. Giving Canada a highly favorable bespoke package short of membership could encourage other peripheral states to seek similar comfortable deals instead of taking on the sacrifices membership entails. Iceland's recent vote against restarting accession talks, driven by a sense that a good deal is possible from outside, is cited as a cautionary example.

Still, closeness is not just talk; concrete steps have been taken. Canada this year joined the EU's SAFE defence-loans program, a 150-billion-euro facility for joint procurement. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation joined the European Broadcasting Union. Deeper economic alignment in less contentious areas is expected to follow. The video's closing argument is structural: for any alliance of middle powers to rival the centralized executives of the United States and China, participants must pool sovereignty for agility. The EU has not fully solved that among its own members, which keeps an agile pact with a partner like Canada ambitious for now.

In sum, near-term progress is more likely in sectoral alignment, defence financing and infrastructure cooperation than in sweeping visa regimes. Associate-membership headlines remain legally discussable over the longer horizon, but the political price and ratification chain leave the timetable uncertain. The Strasbourg address and Brussels meetings therefore matter less as symbols and more as signposts for where, and how fast, the two sides choose to move.